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THE EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR
ACT: AN ACT UNDERGOING JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
Diane S. Mackey*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. History of the Act
On April 7, 1986, President Reagan signed the Comprehensive
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("COBRA").1 The Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA") was enacted as part
of COBRA.2 The Act is commonly known as the "Patient Anti-Dumping
Act." Given the complexity of the Act, it is not surprising that ten years
later, unresolved issues and unsuspecting violators exist.3
Congress enacted EMTALA after a series of congressional hearings in
response to a growing concern about "the provision of adequate emergency-
room medical services to individuals who seek care, particularly the indigent
and uninsured."4 Congress was concerned that emergency departments were
denying uninsured patients the same treatment given to insured patients. In
response, Congress wanted to attack the refusal to provide care and the
transfer of uninsured patients to other facilities, especially when the
receiving facility had not agreed to the patient's transfer. The testimony
about patient dumping was stark and persuasive and included the fact that
some hospitals were abandoning the tradition that any facility with an
emergency department would care for any patient.5
The legislative history makes it clear that the dumping of indigent
patients and those without health insurance was the focus of EMTALA.6 At
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; J.D., University
of Arkansas at Little Rock (1978); B.S., Northwestern University (1958). The author is a
partner in the commercial litigation section, with an emphasis on health and environmental
law, at the law firm of Friday, Eldredge & Clark in Little Rock.
1. Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9121, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd (1994).
2. Id.
3. "ER Errors Prompt Warnings St. Vincent, Baptist Faced Medicare Pull Out,"
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Sept. 8, 1996.
4. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
726-27.
5. See generally Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186 (1986); Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Subcomm.
on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations to the House Committee on
Government Operations, H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1988).
6. COBRA § 9121, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). For purposes of scholarship and
pleadings, EMTALA is the most useful designation.
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enacted statutes requiring hospitals to provide emergency services to some
extent. But the House of Representatives found the statutes and common
law inadequate protection for patients. Although Congress was primarily
concerned about the failure to provide emergency room care because of
economic motives, nowhere in the Act did Congress limit its concern to
persons without economic resources for emergency care.
B. Ambiguities of the Act
Congress left many undefined terms in EMTALA. In response to the
ambiguities, soon after the Act became effective many complaints were filed
alleging a variety of EMTALA violations. By 1990, in the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, EMTALA issues were already being decided.'
Courts have been considering a broad range of EMTALA issues ever since.
The plethora of cases is not surprising, given Congress's enactment of
a statute with ambiguous or easily misunderstood terminology.8 The courts
have relied on the legislative history and statutory language in defining some
of the Act's requirements and in many cases have genuinely and practically
met Congress's intention. The interpretation of other parts of the Act,
however, have expanded the Act beyond its scope defined in hearings and
in Congress and must be surprising to its sponsors. This expansion has
occurred while courts were citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.9 for the proposition that in any dispute over the
meaning of a statute, the language of the statute itself becomes of overriding
importance." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit formulated its
interpretative task by requiring that first the plain meaning of the statute be
consulted and that the court must give effect to any unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress when interpreting the act." Despite the
occasional expansion, as courts have construed EMTALA, the plain words
of the statute have prevailed in most issues relating to interpretation. Thus,
because Congress neglected explicitly to include limitation of the Act's
purview to the economically disadvantaged and uninsured, the courts have
7. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990); Thornton
v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
8. EMTALA can stand as an example of many statutes in which Congress sketches in
the outline and leaves it to the regulators and courts to fill in the effective meaning of the
statute.
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. Id. at 842-43.
11. United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1992); see United States v.
Talley, 16 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 1994).
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declined to limit the Act's coverage to that group and instead have looked
to the statutory language.
II. APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE
The Act protects a wide class of patients from being summarily sent
away from an emergency department. According to 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a),
patients include "any individual" who visits an emergency department. This
designation covers a wide range of people, making no distinctions as to
whether the patients are insured, employed, decent, dirty, psychotic, in the
midst of a drug reaction, illegally in the country, politically unacceptable,
or members of any particular social stratus.
Initially the courts struggled with the issue of whether an EMTALA
plaintiff would be required to plead and prove an improper motive for denial
of emergency services. This was a way of asking whom EMTALA
protected. Several courts required plaintiffs to prove some sort of economic
motive for their dumping.' 2  These decisions were influenced by the
legislative history. In the end, they did not prevail.
In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,13 the court held that
EMTALA applied to all patients, regardless of the motive for turning them
away. The court noted the Act's legislative history, but felt bound by the
Act's unambiguous language to extend its protection to any person presented
to the emergency department, 4 especially since to hold that no showing of
motive is required is consistent with the legislative intent. 5
The Eighth Circuit did not directly resolve the issue in its earliest
EMTALA ruling, Williams v. Birkeness,6 leaving it to the lower courts to
struggle with the issue. 7 However, subsequently, the Eighth Circuit was
squarely presented with the issue in Summers v. Baptist Medical Center
12. See Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272; Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical
Management, 771 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Okla. 1991); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433 (D.
Kan. 1990); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989); Evitt v. University
Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
13. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
14. Id. at 1039-40.
15. See Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1994); Baber
v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131 Cong. Rec.
S13, 904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)); Brooker v. Desert Hosp.
Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., 786 F. Supp.
538, 544 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 769 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (N.D.
Iil. 1991).
16. 34 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 1994).
17. See, e.g., Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Memorial Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
1997] 467
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Arkadelphia.I" In Summers, the plaintiff informed the hospital that he had
money and insurance. The court stated that the plain language of the statute
required that the Act be applicable to "any individual," despite Congress's
original intention to prevent hospitals from refusing treatment based on an
individual's inability to pay. The court added, "[i]f Congress wishes to
narrow the statute's application, it may amend the statutory language."' 9
Therefore, in the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction, any individual is protected by
EMTALA. To the extent a split in authority exists, further decisions will
perhaps clarify the situation, if Congress or the Supreme Court do not
resolve it first.
EMTALA particularly applies to women in active labor. The term
"active labor" is defined as labor at a time at which delivery is imminent,
or there is inadequate time for a safe transfer, or a transfer poses a threat to
mother or baby.20 That term is being further defined by the courts on a
case-by-case basis and has been broadened by court interpretation. In
McIntyre v. Schick,2' a period of seventeen hours between discharge and
delivery did not protect the hospital from EMTALA liability.
22
Another issue concerns whether the patient must actually come to the
emergency department before EMTALA obligations are triggered. The
statutory language addressing this issue states, "In the case of a hospital
that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual (whether or not
eligible for benefits under [Medicare]) comes to the emergency department
.... ,23 Another section provides, however, that, "If any individual
(whether or not eligible for benefits under [Medicare]) comes to the hospital
and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical
condition .... 24
Courts have held that the latter language provides that EMTALA is not
limited to an admission to the emergency department followed by transfer
or discharge of the patient from the hospital.25 In Thornton v. Southwest
Detroit Hospital,26 the court was concerned that a hospital could admit an
18. 69 F.3d 902, 904 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995), reh'g en bane, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996).
19. Id. (citing and relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 241(I),
99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 27 (1976), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 605); Gatewood, 933
F.2d at 1037.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
21. 795 F. Supp 777 (E.D. Va. 1992).
22. Id. at 781.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
25. Helton v. Phelps County Regional Medical Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Mo. 1992);
Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 967
(1992).
26. 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
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emergency department patient and then immediately discharge him from the
service to which the patient was admitted in order to evade EMTALA.27
Given these decisions, a question exists as to whether EMTALA
procedures apply to the discharge of any patient who was in an emergency
medical condition at any time before routine discharge. Whether an
affirmative answer will be universally adopted remains to be seen.
The Health Care Financing Administration's ("HCFA") current position
appears to be that if a patient is admitted through the emergency department
to an inpatient unit and is found to have been transferred from the inpatient
unit to another facility prior to stabilization of the original admitting
diagnosis which led to presentation in the emergency department, the
hospital must comply with EMTALA transfer requirements. On the other
hand, a patient who is admitted through the emergency department to an
inpatient unit, but later transferred for an emergency unrelated to the original
admitting emergency diagnosis, may be transferred without regard to the
EMTALA transfer requirements. This position has been enforced not only
by HCFA but by reviewing courts.28
Because EMTALA compliance will be required of their member
hospitals, managed-care plans with rigid parameters for discharge should
consider the Act before insisting on the discharge of a patient who arguably
has not been sufficiently stabilized for appropriate transfer.29 Were a
plaintiff to be able to support an allegation of failure to stabilize, the
consent, certification, documentation, and appropriate transfer requirements
would apply but would not have been met, and an EMTALA claim could
be made without any proof of negligence.
If the interpretation that any presentation to the hospital creates
EMTALA obligations prevails, those hospitals without emergency depart-
ments would also be under the initial screening requirements. The court in
Helton30 stated that it is the condition of the patient when admitted that is
controlling, not the type of facility in the hospital.
31
It should also be noted that the screening examination that is required
is that which is "within the capability of the hospital's emergency depart-
27. 1d. at 1132.
28. See Hussain v. Kaiser, 914 F. Supp 1331 (E.D. Va. 1996); Smith v. Richmond
Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 967 (1992).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l) (1994).
30. Helton, 794 F. Supp. at 333.
31. Id. Subsection (e)(5) of EMTALA specifically includes a rural primary care
hospital if it is a Medicare provider. It is commonly accepted that a woman in active labor
is a very difficult patient to transfer, even for some rural primary care hospitals or psychiatric
facilities, which may be ill equipped for a delivery that it may be required to provide. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(5) (1994).
1997]
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ment, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency
department." 2 That standard applies whenever an emergency exists. Not
all hospitals have ancillary services. But section 1395dd(b) requires that all
hospitals, no matter which facilities are available at that hospital, must either
do a further medical examination and treatment to stabilize the condition or
provide appropriate transfer to another facility.33 Therefore, although its
facilities may warrant transfer more often, even a psychiatric hospital
without an emergency department should be aware of and comply with
EMTALA in order to avoid liability.
The Ninth Circuit has considered the applicability of an EMTALA
claim under section 1395dd(c)' alone. That section states:
(c) Restricting transfers until individual stabilized. (1) Rule. If an
individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has
not been stabilized (within the meaning of subsection (e)(3)(B) of this
section), the hospital may not transfer the individual unless--
(A)(i) the individual (or a legally responsible person acting on the
individual's behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obligations under
this section and of the risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer to another
medical facility,
(ii) a physician (within the meaning of section 186(r)(1) [42 USCS
§ 1395x(r)(1)] has signed a certificate that[,] based upon the information
available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected from
the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility
outweigh the increased risks to the individual and, in the case of labor, to the
unborn child from effecting the transfer, or
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency department
at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical person (as defined
by the Secretary in regulations) has signed a certification described in clause
(ii) after a physician (as defined in section 186(rX) [42 USCS § 1395x(r)(1)],
in consultation with the person, has made the determination described in such
clause, and subsequently countersigns the certification ......
A subsection (c) claim requires a showing that an individual was at a
hospital and has an emergency condition. Hospitals retort that until a
hospital determines that a patient has an emergency medical condition under
subsection (b), the transfer restrictions of subsection (c) do not operate and
EMTALA does not provide the basis for a claim. In other words, the
procedural requirements do not come into play until after an "appropriate
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
33. Id. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
34. James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(c) (1994).
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medical screening examination," and it is determined that the patient has an
emergency medical condition. The Ninth Circuit joined four other circuits
in holding that there is no liability under subsection (c) unless there has
been a determination that the patient has an emergency medical condition.
6
In Gossling v. Hays Medical Center,37 the court ruled that psychiatric
patients are no exception, so long as they are treated in a participating
hospital. A community mental health center does not qualify as a participat-
ing hospital, so it is not subject to EMTALA.3" The Gossling court did not
rule on the question of whether a community mental health center that
entered into a joint venture with a participating hospital would come within
EMTALA's ambit.39 For psychiatric patients who come to the hospital,
however, because the duty would be the same to every patient regardless of
diagnosis, the answer is so apparent that it does not seem to have been
litigated. The psychiatric patient who comes to an acute care hospital must
be screened. According to HCFA regulations, even a psychiatric hospital
that has never provided emergency services is required by special directive
to comply.' A challenge to HCFA's regulation is likely to be forthcoming.
In any case, a psychiatric hospital has no duty under EMTALA to provide
long-term, non-emergency care."
A term that has not served as the basis of dispute is "participating
hospital." A hospital is considered to be a participating hospital and must
comply with EMTALA if it has a Medicare contract. The patient need not
be a Medicare recipient; it is the hospital's provider status that matters.42
The EMTALA status of a patient picked up by ambulance presents
questions to which there is currently no one answer. In Madison v.
Jefferson Parish Hospital Service,43 it was undisputed that the plaintiff never
actually entered the hospital. The court focused on two requirements before
EMTALA applied: that the individual come to the emergency department,"
36. James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Urban v. King, 43
F.3d 523, 525-27 (10th Cir. 1994); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th
Cir. 1992); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1991); and Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
37. Nos. 92-1488-PFK, 93-1302-PFK, 93-1492-PFK, 1995 WL 254269 (D. Kan. 1995).
38. Id.
39. Id. at *7-8.
40. 59 Fed. Reg. 32,086, 32,101 (1994) (adopted after HCFA lost cases in Texas and
the District of Columbia, which ruled that EMTALA did not apply to psychiatric hospitals
without emergency departments).
41. Gossling, 1995 WL 254269, *9.
42. Summers, 91 F.3d 1136-37.
43. Dt. No. 1, No. 93-2938, 1995 WL 396316 (E.D. La. 1995).
44. The court stated that "comes to the emergency department" means that "the
individual is on hospital property." Id. at *1 ("[p]roperty includes ambulances owned and
1997]
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and that a request be made for examination or treatment.45 Thus, as soon
as the patient enters the hospital's owned and operated ambulance,
EMTALA applied, assuming that the patient or someone on his or her
behalf has requested examination or treatment. If the patient is en route in
an ambulance that is not owned and operated by the hospital, and the
ambulance has not yet arrived on the hospital's property, including the
parking lot, the hospital may refuse to accept the patient if the paramedic
calls the hospital. If the ambulance comes to the hospital anyway, the
hospital must accept the patient. Obviously questions exist about joint-
venture and independent contractor relationships between hospitals and
ambulance services. These questions have yet to be resolved either by
regulation or court decision. The practical implication is that because
ambulances may be considered to be part of the hospital, administrators
must not neglect training their ambulance or emergency department staffs
about EMTALA applicability.
As the court in Madison noted, before the Act applies to a patient, the
patient or someone on behalf of the patient must make a request for
examination or treatment. 46  That request can be withdrawn by the
requesting person or patient. 4" Special care must be taken in such situations,
because the patient's competency to make such a decision will likely be
questioned as to whether in fact there was a withdrawal. A request should
be presumed for a comatose or incompetent, unaccompanied patient as a
matter of hospital risk-reduction policy. That presumption is not specifically
required by the statute, but it is likely that courts will infer the request from
the patient's presence at the hospital.
To summarize, EMTALA applies to every individual in an emergency
medical condition who comes to a hospital, whether the patient is rich or
poor or whether he is an acceptable kind of patient.
operated by the hospital, even if the ambulance is not on hospital grounds .... .") (citing 42
C.F.R. § 489.24 (1994)). The language in subsection (b) is simply not discussed.
45. Id. at *2. There is no statutory basis for HCFA's interpretation. Therefore, should
a hospital be faced with this issue, it has good grounds to challenge the conclusion. Because
only hospital owned and operated, not leased ambulances, are subject to this regulation.
counsel may wish to arrange the organization of the hospital's ambulance (and clinic)
services in light of HCFA's position. See also, Letter from Anthony J. Tirone, Director,
Office of Survey & Certification, HCFA, to Robert E. Dobley, undated.
46. Madison, No. 93-2938, 1995 WL 39316 (E.D. La. 1995).
47. When this occurs, clear documentation is required; because in case of an EMTALA
challenge, the hospital will presumably have the burden of proving withdrawal.
All [Vol. 19
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III. LIABILITY UNDER EMTALA
Hospitals are liable to patients and their families for EMTALA
violations.4 This liability may extend even to emotional distress, although
this determination will vary with the jurisdiction where the case is brought.'
Hospitals are liable to patients for violations of EMTALA for all the
harm that proximately results from the violations, but hospitals are not liable
for bad medical decisions and treatment.5' If a patient wants to claim
medical malpractice, the patient must allege a pendant claim based on state
law. To some extent this permits plaintiffs in non-diversity medical cases
to get to federal court if the EMTALA claim is not denied on motion to
dismiss or summary judgment. If the EMTALA claim fails, the pendant
malpractice claim is subject to dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.5 ' The
plaintiff must to plead an EMTALA claim, not a medical malpractice claim,
to stay in federal court.
The amount of damages awarded is subject to state law, thereby raising
questions about the application of comparative fault, damage caps, and
procedures. 2 The private litigant simply files a civil action in federal court
to initiate an action against a hospital.
Hospitals are liable to the government for civil penalties as well.53
These penalties are up to $25,000 for a less than 100-bed hospital and
$50,000 for larger hospitals for each violation. Penalties also include the
possibility of the hospital's revocation of Medicare participation5 4 If the
hospital violates EMTALA procedures in dealing with a number of patients
due to a faulty emergency protocol, it can be fined for each patient
affected.55 It is conceivable that a claim under the False Claims Act could
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).
49. See McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F. Supp. 777, 781-82 (E.D. Va. 1992) (patient stating
a claim under Virginia law).
50. Summers v. Baptist Medical Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1136-39 (8th Cir.
1996).
51. See Palmer v. Hospital Auth. of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1994).
The court had authority, but could dismiss based on its discretion. EMTALA must only be
non-frivolous when filed.
52. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Bisdyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1995);
Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 860-66 (4th Cir. 1994); Tank v. Chronister,
(D. Kan. 1996); Lane v. Calhoun-Liberty County Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D.
Fla. 1994); Cooper v. Gulf Breeze Hosp., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 1541-43 (N.D. Fla. 1993);
Helton v. Phelps County Regional Med. Ctr., 817 F. Supp. 789, 791-92 (E.D. Mo. 1993);
Griffith v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 826 F. Supp. 382, 383-85 (D. Kan. 1993).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(l)(a) (1994).
54. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a (1996). The procedure by which the government conducts
its enforcement and provisions for appeal are located in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(c), (d), and
(e).
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be filed alleging that the service for which reimbursement is claimed was
not delivered if an appropriate screening is not given but the claim for
examination is filed anyway.
If a medical facility violates EMTALA when it transfers a patient and
the receiving hospital suffers a financial loss as a result, the receiving
hospital may institute a civil action to recoup any losses. 6 The original
legislative intent to deal with indigent dumping is evident here." It would
be the indigent patient without insurance who would create a loss for the
receiving hospital. Additionally, because Medicaid reimbursement does not
reimburse in full, one can imagine that a case could be brought to recover
the hospital's difference in cost and Medicaid reimbursement. In fact, this
provision" has not been invoked by a great number of hospitals, although
anecdotal information indicates a recent increase. 9
County and municipal hospitals may not avail themselves of sovereign
immunity because the suits against them are not suits directly against the
state.' The defense of charitable immunity has not been raised in a
published EMTALA case, and would be of unpredictable usefulness.
What about physicians? After all, it is they who adopt emergency
department protocols and make the medical decisions in those cases where
damages are claimed. Nevertheless, a patient cannot file an EMTALA
action against a hospital physician.6'
The physician who is responsible for the examination, treatment, or
transfer (including the on-call doctor) is, however, liable to the government
for civil monetary penalties in the amount of not more than $50,000 for
each violation. The doctor may even be excluded from Medicare
participation if his violation is gross, flagrant, or repeated.63
Imbedded in the language of the statutes are several defenses that a
physician may claim to defeat an enforcement action.(' He may deny
responsibility for the patient, deny that he negligently violated EMTALA,
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1994).
57. See Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B) (1994).
59. Presentation by Maureen Mudren, American Hospital Association, Address at the
New York Greater Hospital Association (Oct. 11, 1996).
60. See, e.g., Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206, 655 S.W.2d 459 (1983).
61. Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1995); King v.
Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1994); Deloney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 393 (10th Cir.
1993); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 878 (4th Cir. 1992). There appears
to be no disagreement.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1994).
63. Id.
64. The procedure against the physician is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) and (b)
(1994).
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and deny certification or knowledge that the medical risks of transfer would
outweigh the benefits. Also, he can maintain that he misrepresented nothing
but instead followed the Act.6
A word of caution is necessary. When the statute speaks of negligence
in connection with a claim against the doctor, it states clearly, "negligently
violated EMTALA."'' Once again, the plain language shows that the
legislative intent is not to federalize general medical negligence. Instead,
the statute deals only with violations of EMTALA and its requirements.
Those requirements have nothing to do with medical negligence and failure
to meet the applicable standard of medical care.
A partial "safe harbor" is provided by the statute for use by a physician
in a specific situation.67 If the physician conducts a medical examination,
presumably "appropriate," and decides that the patient requires services by
another doctor who is on-call, notifies the on-call physician, and the on-call
physician refuses or fails to appear in a reasonable time, the original doctor
can order that the patient be transferred without being subject to a civil
monetary penalty by the government because without the services of the on-
call physician the benefits of transfer outweigh the risks. 8 This section
does, however, reserve the right for the government to seek penalties from
the hospital due to the absent on-call physician.69 Presumably, the hospital
will be allowed to defend itself on the basis that it and its staff, save for the
recalcitrant, physician, performed properly under the Act so that it should
not be fined. The Act does not say that; it does say that one person who
refuses to do his duty could cost the hospital a huge fine, which would seem
highly inequitable. The statute does speak of "such equitable relief as is
appropriate" for the patient.70 Appropriate equitable relief should also be
considered for hospitals in this particular situation no matter who the
claimant.
The statute of limitations for actions pursuant to EMTALA is two years
after the violation. 7' In a state similar to Arkansas, with a two-year tort
statute of limitations,72 EMTALA realistically will not be used to "backdoor"
an extension of the statute for medical malpractice actions. In states such
as Tennessee, however, the applicable statute of limitations is one year, and
it would not be surprising to see plaintiffs trying to evade the statute by
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (1994).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(C) (1994).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (1994).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C) (1994).
72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-14-203 (Michie 1987).
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claiming an EMTALA violation, which is really a medical malpractice
claim.
Besides damages and fines, injunctive relief to bar future violation is
available.73 This sort of relief is more likely, one would expect, in
conjunction with a claim for damages rather than standing alone. 74
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT
A. The Appropriate Medical Screening Examination
Once a patient has come to the emergency department and a request
has been made on his behalf for examination or treatment for a medical
condition, the Act states: "[T]he hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the
emergency department . . . ."" Subsection (b)(1) of the Act does not use
the words "appropriate medical screening examination," but the requirement
seems implicit, since the subsection states that, "if any individual . . comes
to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either (a) within the
staff and facilities available ... for such further medical examination and
such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition or (B)
for transfer of the individual ....
Unfortunately the term "appropriate medical screening examination" is
not defined, probably because of the difficulty of getting a consensus on a
definition that would apply to each particular medical circumstance.
Therefore, it has been left to the courts to define that term. Much of the
litigation to date has focused on just what constitutes an "appropriate"
examination. The litigation has been particularly important, far beyond the
EMTALA need to define the term so that hospitals can act accordingly,
because at the heart of the dispute over the definition is the issue of whether
EMTALA really is a federal medical malpractice statute in anti-dumping
clothing or is instead a statute setting procedural obligations without duties
relating to the standard of care. As one court put it, EMTALA is not to
decide whether the diagnosis resulting from the examination was right or
73. Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
74. Cf Hart v. Riverside Hosp., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Va. 1995). The Hart
court also discussed standing in a private action, limiting it to one who has suffered personal
harm. Id. at 266.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
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wrong or whether the techniques to stabilize were acceptable within the
standards of practice applicable to a given situation.77 As each circuit has
spoken to the general obligations of a hospital, as to screening and as to
stabilization when required, they have spoken clearly to differentiate medical
malpractice claims from EMTALA claims.78
Therefore, it is clear that when the statute requires an "appropriate"
medical screening, it is not speaking of a screening up to the applicable
standard of care nor is it speaking of a screening that results in a correct
diagnosis.79 Instead, the statutory requirement, which makes it "appropri-
ate," is a uniform screening. Each court has formulated the requirement in
slightly different language, but that is the heart of their definitions. Often
"disparate" or "standard" is added to or substituted for "uniform," but the
meaning remains the same: that the screening must be provided that is the
same for every patient presented in the same condition.8"
77. Because of the importance of the answer to this question, many of the cases, when
they reached the appellate level, have been argued by amicus curiae. See, e.g., Summers v.
Baptist Medical Ctr.-Arkadelphia, 69 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 1995), reh'g en banc, 91 F.3d 1132
(8th Cir. 1996) (Arkansas Hosp. Ass'n); Vogel v. Linde, 23 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1994)
(American Hosp. Ass'n); Bunditt v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362
(5th Cir. 1991) (Calif. Med. Ass'n); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir.
1994) (American Hosp. Ass'n); Richmond Memorial Hosp. v. Smith, 416 S.E.2d 689 (Va.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 967 (1992) (American Hosp. Ass'n).
78. Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) ("'[A]nalysis
by hindsight' is not sufficient to impose a liability under EMTALA"); Eberhardt v. City of
Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1995); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n., 42 F.3d
851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 514 (1996) ("EMTALA is not a substitute
for state law malpractice actions"); Repp v. Anadorko Mun. Hosp., 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th
Cir. 1994) (EMTALA "is 'neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute"'); Holcomb v.
Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994) (EMTALA is "not designed to redress a
negligent diagnosis"); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (EMTALA "is not intended to duplicate pre-existing legal protections").
79. De minimis variations may be tolerated. See, e.g., Repp v. Anadorko Mun. Hosp.,
43 F.3d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1994). But de minimis is in the eye of the beholder, not the
hospital.
80. See, e.g., Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 1996); Repp
v. Anadorko Mun. Hosp., 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994); Power v. Arlington Hosp.
Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994); Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 91(1994); Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc. 996 F.2d 708, 713 (4th
Cir. 1993); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 879 (4th Cir. 1992). Introduction
of the term "triage" creates difficulties. If used in the traditional sense that it involves a
"sorting" of patients, it is a dangerous concept to introduce into EMTALA compliance
procedures, although the Act seems to recognize that uniform treatment is required for
patients in the same, not different conditions. Triage is not an appropriate medical screening
examination in the EMTALA context. It may begin the examination, but it is not the
examination. When state regulations, particularly relating to Medicaid managed care, use the
term, it creates confusion among providers.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Power makes it clear that it is up to the hospital to choose whether to
have one general or several tailored protocols for screening, depending on
the exhibited symptoms.8" Summers adds that the standard screening
procedure does not have to be in writing.8 2 In that case, it would seem
imperative that all physicians and registered nurses know it. The discussion
in Power, however, makes it clear that it is not enough to have a standard
screening procedure and that everyone know it; it must also be applied every
time, twenty-four hours a day. If the hospital departs from this procedure,
a violation of EMTALA has occurred. 3
EMTALA contains other qualifiers relative to the "appropriate" medical
screening. The examination requirement is limited to the capability of the
hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services available to
the emergency department.' The plain language creates a multilevel
definition. A hospital need only screen to the level of its resources; and, of
course, these resources will vary. This provision is especially useful for
small community and rural hospitals that cannot duplicate the resources of
an urban teaching hospital.
The uniformity of screening must apply to the use of available ancillary
services.85 If an MRI is available, and it would be used should the
Governor come to the hospital, then the MRI must be used for all in order
to meet the uniformity requirement of an appropriate screening. One
assumes that the variety of such resources is one factor that prevented
Congress from further defining "appropriate medical screening." The
medical screenings must be conducted by a qualified member of the medical
staff, a person whose scope of practice includes assessments,8 6 and a
sufficient number of medical and nursing personnel must be available to
meet anticipated needs.
81. Power, 42 F.3d at 859-60.
82. Summers, 69 F.3d at 904.
83. See also Richmond v. Community Hosp. of Roanoke, 885 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Va.
1995). Power suggests that there could be a uniform screening which is of so little content
as to violate EMTALA. Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n., 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
85. Id.
86. Condition of Participation: Emergency Services, 42 C.F.R. § 482.55 (1997).
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B. The "Emergency Medical Condition"
The purpose of required screening is to discover "whether or not an
emergency medical condition exists."'' The term is quite broad, but has not
bred as much specific litigation as the phrase "appropriate medical
screening." This may be because Congress used language that practitioners
could interpret in the reality of the emergency department. Had EMTALA
been ruled to be a federal malpractice statute, however, one would expect
that whether a correct determination relating to the patient's medical
condition had been made would become the battlefield. Indeed, many
EMTALA complaints alleging an inappropriate screening have been
dismissed when the complainant was really attacking the diagnosis that no
emergency medical condition existed. In the future, attacks on misdiagnoses
are vulnerable to dismissal, given the widespread opinions that EMTALA
is not concerned with the standard of care, but rather with compliance with
procedures. Therefore, it is unlikely that this term, standing alone, will be
the focus of court development."8
HCFA regulations require that the hospital governing board designate
the medical personnel that can serve as qualified medical personnel
("QMP"). Emergency medical technicians or registered nurses have been
designated, although physicians are the usual QMPs. Unfortunately, many
hospital boards do not know of the requirement, which is not difficult to
meet. Designation should provide an opportunity for discussion about all
EMTALA requirements at the board level.
87. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a) (1994). "Emergency medical condition" is defined in
subsection (e)(l) as:
(1) The term 'emergency medical condition' means-
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman
or the unborn child.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l) (1994).
88. See Condition of Participation: Emergency Services, 42 C.F.R. § 482.55 (1997).
The policies and procedures in an emergency department must be established by the medical
staff, and are a continuing responsibility of that staff. Id.
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If after the uniform screening, the determination is made that no
emergency medical condition exists, EMTALA obligations end. The Act
simply does not apply to a non-emergency situation. No requirement exists
to stabilize or transfer, absent the emergency condition.89  Adequate
documentation of the conclusion and the basis for the conclusion must be
entered into the chart and signed by the QMP. Standard emergency
department discharge procedures would then take place. State regulations
and Medicare standards may require more, most notably a physician's
determination.
C. Procedure if the "Condition" Exists
If after the uniform screening, it is determined that an emergency
medical condition exists, it is said that the hospital must treat or transfer.
The statutory terms are "stabilize" or "transfer." The statute speaks in the
alternative.90 The hospital's duty is not to alleviate completely an emer-
gency medical condition, but rather to stabilize it.91
The necessity of transfer is definitional of EMTALA coverage and
EMTALA may not be applicable if the patient is immediately admitted to
the hospital. In that situation HCFA maintains that when a patient comes
in with an emergency medical condition and is admitted, that patient
remains an EMTALA case that will require the hospital to follow EMTALA
discharge procedures even days later.92 The statutory requirement states that
the emergency department must attempt to stabilize or to transfer. 93 In most
89. Green v. Reddy, 918 F. Supp. 329, 334-35 (D. Kan. 1996).
90. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
91. Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991). EMTALA does
define "stabilize," in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) as:
[W]ith respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph (I)(A),
to provide such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure,
within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the
condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in
paragraph (1)(B), to deliver (including the placenta). (B) The term "stabilized"
means, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph
(1)(A), that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in
paragraph (1)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the placenta).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3) (1994).
92. Letter from Teresa L. Trimble, Chief Survey & Certification Branch, Division of
Health Standards & Quality to R. C. Sinnott, M.D. (Sept. 26, 1995). Contra, Hussain v.
Kaiser Found., 914 F. Supp. 1331, 1334-35 (E.D. Va. 1996).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l) states:
If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter [42
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cases the sequence is that if stabilization fails, transfer is undertaken if
possible. In those cases in which the facility, immediately after screening,
determines that it cannot handle the emergency, transfer is the acceptable
alternative. The difference, but not necessarily the sequence, is important,
however, in analyzing whether the patient was properly "stabilized," and
whether he was properly "transferred." There is no legal support in
EMTALA for the proposition that the patient must be stabilized before
transfer.
This should not be understood as allowing a hospital to find an
emergency medical condition, decide to transfer properly, and do nothing in
between. The court noted in Eberhart that a hospital should provide
individualized treatment to assure that no material deterioration of the
patient's condition is likely to result, and hospitals should not merely
provide uniform stabilizing procedures. 94
Keep in mind that the duty to stabilize does not arise until the
emergency nature of the condition is known to the QMP. The hospital is
required to stabilize only that condition known to it.95 One court held that
its duty does extend to conditions that the facility should have known. % If,
based on what the QMP knows after screening, an emergency condition
exists, stabilization efforts or transfer should ensue. The duty to provide
stabilizing treatment arises even if the required treatment would exceed the
prevailing standard of care.97 This does not create a standard of care for
USCS §§ 1395 et seq.] comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical
condition, or (B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in
accordance with subsection (c).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(l) (1994).
94. Eberhart, 62 F.3d at 1259. The court wrote, "[We] do note that the stabilization
requirement is not met by simply dispensing uniform stabilizing treatment, but rather, by
providing the treatment necessary' to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no
material deterioration of the condition is likely to result .. .- 42 U.S.C. 1395dd (e)(3)(A)
(1994). See also, In the Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir.) ("'The Hospital must
provide that treatment necessary to prevent the material deterioration of each patient's
emergency medical condition."'), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
95. Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 1995); Baber v.
Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992); Gatewood v. Washington
Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care
Corp., Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990); Gossling v. Hays Medical Ctr., Nos. 92-1488-
PFK, 93-1302-PFK, 93-1492-PFK, 1995 WL 254269 (D. Kan. Apr. 21, 1995).
96. Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
97. In the Matter of Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 596 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91
(1994).
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stabilization. Instead it means that the facility cannot justify lack of
stabilizing treatment on this basis. 98
The statute provides no explicit guidance for the situation when an
emergency medical condition exists but is treated so that an emergency no
longer exists. This omission requires the conclusion that EMTALA
obligations have ended with the treatment. Stabilized would be an
inappropriate term to describe this situation. "Stabilize" implies a continued
emergency. Yet stabilization or transfer are the only options provided for
in the Act. When there is no continuing emergency, because the emergency
has been treated, one would argue that the EMTALA obligations have been
met, unless one considers this situation to constitute a transfer. If so, what
procedures apply? None are spelled out. A prudent hospital will require
careful documentation by a QMP of the basis for a discharge with complete
treatment and certification that an emergency medical condition no longer
exists. The Department of Health and Human Services has affirmed this
principle. 99 Any conclusion other than that a hospital may discharge a
screened and treated patient without EMTALA liability would throw
emergency care into total disarray.
On the other hand, an argument that the Act's provisions apply can be
made based on statutory language:
The term 'transfer' means the movement (including the discharge) of an
individual outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of any person
employed by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly with) the
hospital, but does not include such a movement of an individual who (A)
has been declared dead, or (B) leaves the facility without the permission
of any such person.1°°
A strict reading of that language compels the conclusion that every
discharge of a patient who had an emergency medical condition is a transfer
pursuant to EMTALA. If that is the case, all the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(c) apply to every emergency department discharge, including the
certification. Yet the requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) apply only to
unstabilized patients. The patient treated beyond stabilization is not
addressed. One can predict, however, that if the decision to release as fully
98. Id.
99. Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513, 22,517 (1988)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405). The department's comments relating to the Proposed
Rule on Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care for the Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services included the following: "[Ihe hospital is responsible
for treating and stabilizing any individual... and for providing such care until the condition
ceases to be an emergency or until the patient is properly transferred to another facility." Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) (1994).
[Vol. 19
MEDICAL TREATMENT
treated is challenged, a battle of experts will ensue as to whether the patient
was fully treated, or whether the patient was stabilized.1'
Assuming that the patient has been screened and cannot be stabilized,
specific procedures for the emergency department personnel are laid out in
the Act. If the patient is not stabilized, then the emergency department
personnel must follow the special transfer rules."2 Perhaps because of this
specificity, there is less reported litigation on transfer issues, although there
may be more enforcement. Nevertheless, there has been recent case law
analyzing when transfer requirements apply.'0 3
The Act mentions, but has no specific direction for, the patient who is
screened and stabilized, but still in need of treatment. It does not state
whether the patient may be discharged, admitted, or transferred. Presum-
ably, so long as a hospital can verify that it did stabilize the patient, as
defined in EMTALA, it is free to do as it chooses."° The decision will be
restricted, not by EMTALA, but by the requisite standard of care. At any
rate, an attempt to achieve stabilization cannot be avoided by choosing to
transfer instead, even though the Act's language seems to offer that
alternative. Conservative practice would mandate that, even in the case of
a stabilized patient, when a transfer to another medical facility is contem-
plated, the transfer provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) must be complied
with, even though the Act has no such explicit requirement.'0 5
101. See, e.g., Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994).
102. Tank v. Chronister, 941 F. Supp. 969 (D. Kan. 1996).
103. See, e.g., James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case the
patient was at the hospital before the emergency medical condition occurred. Id.
104. Se Green v. Tuoro Infirmary, 992 F.2d 537, 539 (6th Cir. 1993).
105. EMTALA defines appropriate transfer as follows:
An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer-
(A) in which the transferring hospital provides the medical treatment within
its capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual's health, and in the case
of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child;
(B) in which the receiving facility-
(i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of the
individual, and
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide
appropriate medical treatment;
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all
medical records (or copies thereof), related to the emergency condition for which
the individual has presented, available at the time of the transfer, including
records related to the individual's emergency medical condition, observations of
signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, treatment provided, results of any tests
and the informed written consent or certification (or copy thereof) provided under
paragraph (1)(A), and the name and address of any on-call physician (described
in subsection (d)(1)(C) of this section) who has refused or failed to appear within
a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing treatment;
(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and
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The initial transfer requirements can be summarized as requiring that:
(1) the patient or his legal representative consents in writing; (2) the
physician signs a certification that the medical benefits of transfer outweigh
the risks to the individual; or (3) if the physician is not physically present,
a qualified medical person signs the certification after a physician in
consultation with the person has made the appropriate risk/benefit determina-
tion, and the physician subsequently countersigns the certification.'0 6 The
Act also requires that a summary of the risks and benefits be included in the
certification. 7
The plaintiff in an EMTALA action will have the burden of proving,
presumably with the help of a medical expert, that any deterioration of
condition was likely during, or was the result of, a transfer. °8 The hospital,
however, must prove its compliance with the "technical" requirements as set
out in subsection (c)(1). 109 Hospitals ought to protect themselves by
educating the emergency department staff and adopting a protocol that
covers all transfers. Creation of easy to use forms will encourage compli-
ance.
A hospital's compliance will extend to the type of transportation used
for a transfer."0 The staffs of the emergency department and ambulances
are presumed and required to be adequate. Sending an unstabilized patient
in an ordinary automobile would likely be a violation."' Were that the only
transportation available, then travel with a qualified person with life support
systems in the car might be sufficient. Given the choice between helicopter
or ambulance transfer, the helicopter may be required despite its greater cost
if time is important.
No transfer may be made of an unstabilized patient without physician
approval. In a rural area, where transfer is most likely to be needed, and
where physician approval cannot be obtained speedily, this could create a
hardship. The Act, however, makes no provision and gives no leeway for
such situations." 2
transportation equipment, as required including the use of necessary and medically
appropriate life support measures during the transfer; and
(E) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary may find
necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals transferred.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1994).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1994).
107. Id.
108. See Green, 992 F.2d at 539; Deron v. Wilkins, 879 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1994).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(D) (1994).
111. See id.
112. An on-call physician who has an agreement for emergency department coverage
with the hospital has a duty to respond, but, according to a Texas court, the physician may
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The consent requirement, however, does have provisions to complete
transfer despite the absence of consent. This exception should be relied
upon only when necessary because a violation could be found if the hospital
negligently failed to obtain or pursue consent, or made only halfhearted
attempts to get it. Information relating to risks and benefits must be given
carefully and will influence consent in most cases. Failure to obtain
consent, or even worse, a pattern of failure, would reflect on the informed
consent process, as well as EMTALA compliance.
IV. CONCLUSION
EMTALA was enacted to address a specific social problem--the refusal
by some hospital emergency departments to care for the medically indigent
or uninsured. Courts, however, have interpreted the law to be much
broader. What seemed to be a fairly straightforward set of rules has proven
difficult to comply with because the Act does not explicitly cover many
cases that are presented to an emergency department, and because HCFA
regulations have sometimes gone beyond the statutory basis for those
regulations.
Nevertheless, every hospital must conform its emergency department
practices to the Act's requirements. The Act has been in effect long enough
that the claim of innocence due to ignorance will not shield the hospitals
and its physicians from liability, unless they can demonstrate earnest efforts
to comply with EMTALA.
decline to provide treatment and thereby avoid creating a doctor-patient relationship. The
mere fact that the doctor is "on-call" is not enough to create that relationship. St. John v.
Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995). In reality most on-call doctors will be in a contractual
relationship with the hospital and therefore must respond.
1997] 485

